PM Asquith's poor handling of the Irish Home Rule Crisis, 1910-1914. - page 4
Keywords: ireland home rule crisis 1910 1914 20th century asquith redmond carson bonar law liberals conservatives ulster unionists unionism irish parliamentary party
By exploiit on 19/06/2010
Level: A Level (Year 13)
Page Number: 4 of 5 pages: 1 2 3 4 5
for Sinn Féin propaganda to take effect and people began more and more to realise that Home Rule for which they had to wait so patiently did not, in fact, amount to very much” (Beckett). As well as this, Redmond was aware that he could not truly exert too much pressure on the Liberal government as Asquith was aware that if Redmond “did break the government he would simultaneously postpone Home Rule indefinitely” (Lyons) under a Conservative administration. Furthermore, Redmond was worried about the IVF’s lack of discipline and demanded that the organisation be controlled to a degree by the IPP, eventually resulting in a split which encouraged many to throw their support behind the more dissident IRB.
Also important to consider is the impact caused by the Liberal party’s failure to fully agree on a more specific Home Rule agreement. Whilst all members supported Home Rule, how it should be implemented was fairly ambiguous. The Agar Robartes Amendment in June 1912 was suggestive of this; Robartes suggested that four county exclusion should be considered so as to pacify the Protestant majority in the North East of Ulster. This was an embarrassment to the government who had explicitly proposed Home Rule on an all-Ireland basis, and was subsequently made to look divided and willing to compromise on their commitments. Constant similar suggestions from the government (which included four county exclusion, six county exclusion, and an individual county opt-out) were indicative of government weakness and willingness to negotiate. Asquith can also be criticised as he left it very late to propose real compromises – it wasn’t until 1914 that he really began to consider them and, by this time, both the opposition and the Nationalist movement had been allowed to develop into powerful forces that were not inclined to compromise. Adopting the ‘wait and see’ approach in 1912 had resulted in failure for Asquith, although this criticism is perhaps only appropriate with hindsight – it is unlikely that either side would have subsided to negotiations so early on in the process. Failure to agree on a settlement cannot be said to lie solely with the government however, as Unionists were also slow on this. Although Unionists in Ulster proposed both six and nine county exclusion, the move was tactical – Carson believed that they key to the union was the North East, and that if Ulster could resist Home Rule then it
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